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SECTION 6(b)(5) OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ACT OF 1970: IS COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS REQUIRED?
INTRODUCTION
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act) I seeks to
assure that every American's working conditions are safe and health-
ful. 2 The Act also attempts to lessen the economic harms resulting
from job-related accidents and diseases 3 and to eliminate any com-
petitive advantage enjoyed by companies unconcerned with safety. 4
To achieve these goals, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) is charged with regulating various health and safety
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). The Act has been the subject of academic de-
bate ever since its enactment. E.g., R. Smith, The Occupational Safety and Health
Act (1976); Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of
Torts, 38 Law & Contemp. Prob. 613 (1974); Morey, Mandatory Occupational Safety
and Health Standards-Some Legal Problems, 38 Law & Contemp. Prob. 584 (1974).
2. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976)
("The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy ... to assure so far as possi-
ble every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions and to preserve our human resources .... "). Workplace health hazards, such as
poor ventilation in mines and poisonous emissions in factories, first caused concern in
the sixteenth century. J. Follmann, The Economics of Industrial Health 12 (1978). By
1800, many improvements had been made, including use of gas masks and safety
lamps in mines. Id. In the United States, because most early health agencies were
operated by states, regulations were not uniform. Id. at 15-17. The effect of regula-
tions in one state could be nullified by another state with more lenient standards
because industries could move to states that did not ban hazardous substances. Sell-
ate Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, at 144 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
3. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1976).
"'The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations
impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in
terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation
payments." Id. The resultant annual loss to the gross national product, at the time
the Act was enacted, was estimated to be over $8 billion. Legislative History, supra
note 2, at 142. An estimated 4,000 miners die of black lung (pneumoconiosis) each
year; 100,000 of the 500,000 asbestos workers will die of lung cancer; 12% to 30% of
the 800,000 textile and cotton workers will develop brown lung (byssinosis); and 600
to 1,100 uranium miners will develop cancer over the next 20 years. J. Follinan,
supra note 2, at 70. The threats to the American worker include carcinogenic chemi-
cals, lasers, ultrasonic energy, pesticides, noise, and vibration. Legislative History,
supra note 2, at 142-43. See generally N. Ashford, Crisis in the Workplace: Occupa-
tional Disease and Injury 3-12 (1976); J. Follmann, supra note 2, at 67-93.
4. Legislative History, supra note 2, at 144. Employers, especially smaller com-
panies, often lack the economic incentive to take safety precautions. id. The Act also
attempts to guard against the possibility that employees, as well as employers, might
disregard safety to increase productivity. For instance, employees who are working at
a piecework rate might sacrifice safety for speed. Id. at 343,
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hazards.5 The decision to regulate, like any other decision with
economic consequences, is based at a minimum on an informal cost
analysis. 6 Governmental cost analysis, however, must be more pre-
cise and mathematical than the informal weighing done by individu-
als, 7 and various levels of precision can be mandated by Congress to
limit a government agency's discretion. 8
5. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. §§ 2(b)(3). 3j8). 29 U.S.C. §
651(b)(3), 652(8) (1976). Before any standard can be promulgated under the Act.
OSHA must find a significant workplace hazard. The Act does not require that
employment be risk free; on the contrary. a significant risk of harn must exist before
a hazard can be regulated. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100
S. Ct. 2844, 2864 (1980) (plurality opinion). The Secretary must find. as a threshold
matter, that the hazard in question poses a significant health risk and that the regula-
tion is "therefore 'reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide a safe workplace.
Id. at 2850 (quoting Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. § 3(8 . 29 U.S.C. §
652(8) (1976)). The Supreme Court has held that this requirement applies to stan-
dards promulgated under § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). as well as to all
other standards promulgated under the Act. 100 S. Ct. at 2864. The plurality argued
that repeated use of the term "standard" in § 6(b)(5) requires that the § 3(8) defini-
tion be incorporated into § 6(b)(5). Id. The dissent rejected this risk requirement
because existing scientific evidence is usually inadequate to make a **threshold finding
of 'significance.' " Id. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the
express language of § 6(b)(5) is not superseded by the language of § 38) on this
point. Id. at 2899 n.28.
6. Cost analysis, as used in this Note, is a generic term that encompasses any
consideration of economic factors. Assuming that everything can be measured in
economic terms, every decision can be evaluated in terms of cost analysis. Kasper.
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmnental Decisionmnaking. 45 Geo. \Vash. L. Rev.
1013, 1014-15 (1977). The Act requires only an informal cost analysis under § 6(bQt5)
when deciding whether to regulate, see 45 Fed. Reg. 5001. 5285 t1980) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1990.132). and how to regulate. See Brief for Federal Parties
at 70-71, Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.. 100 S. Ct. 2444 (1980)
(OSHA's brief).
7. Regulations promulgated under the Act are upheld if supported by "substantial
evidence in the record considered as a whole." Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, § 6(f), 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). This test requires a careful identification of the
reasons for regulation. Facts must be evidenced in the record when a determination
is made on a factual basis, and persuasive considerations must be identified when
policy judgments are made. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,
475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This "substantial evidence" test puts a greater burden onl
OSHA than the usual "arbitrary and capricious" test of the Admninistrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), but still gives OSHA broad discretionary authority.
AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub non.
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.V. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6. 1980
(Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583). But see note 5 supra (OSHA can regulate only significant
health risks). Various commentators argue that government should perform strict cost
analysis. E.g., R. Smith, supra note 1, at 36-37; Green, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment
and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 45 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 901, 904 (197T);
Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Government Regu-
lation, 43 Geo. WVash. L. Rev. 808, 810-11 (1975); Hapgood, Risk-Benefit Analysis.
Atlantic, Jan. 1979, at 33, 36. But see 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5250 (1980); Green, supra.
at 910.
8. E.g., Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976). Clean Air Act. 42
U.S.C. § 7545 (c)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1978). The language of any act in some 'ay limits
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Language that arguably restricts OSHA's power to promulgate
standards by mandating cost analysis are delineated in two sections of
the Act. Section 3(8) provides that an occupational safety and health
standard be "reasonably necessary or appropriate." 9  Section 6(b)(5)
requires that standards regulating toxic materials or harmful physical
agents be "feasible." 10 This Note examines the question of whether
the "feasible" language of section 6(b)(5) or the interaction of this lan-
guage with that of section 3(8) 11 requires a formal cost analysis when
the power delegated to an administrative agency, although the permissible delegation
can be quite broad. For example, appropriate administrative powers can be gleaned
solely from the purpose and context of the act. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.
742, 785 (1948). A broad delegation is not unconstitutional if it sufficiently marks the
field in which the administrator can comply with legislative intent. Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F.
Supp. 737, 745 (D.D.C. 1971); California Teachers Ass'n v. Newport Mesa Unified
School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 436, 446 (C.D. Cal. 1971). A minimal definiteness, how-
ever, is needed before Congress can delegate authority to an administrative agency.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 538-39 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); see J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J. Young,
Handbook on Constitutional Law 140, 147 (1978). Justice Rehnquist argued in In-
dustrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980), that the
"feasibility" language of § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976), is so indefinite that it
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional authority. 100 S. Ct. at
2886 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The plurality suggested that failure to quantify sub-
stantially the risk necessary for the promulgation of standards could, but in this in-
stance did not, constitute an unconstitutional delegation. 100 S. Ct. at 2866 (plurality
opinion). The dissent rejected the application of the delegation doctrine, arguing that
the plain meaning of "feasible," as well as the contexts in which Congress had previ-
ously used the word, made it sufficiently definite. Id. at 2902 n.30 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Because the primary purpose of the Act is to protect health and promote
safety, Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S. Ct. 883, 890 (1980), it should be liberally
construed to achieve that Congressional purpose. Id. at 891; see United States v. An
Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969); Lilly v. Grand Trunk
W.R.R., 317 U.S. 481. 486 (1943).
9. Occupation Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8)
(1976).
10. Id. § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). A toxic substance is a substance
that poses an unreasonable risk to humans and the environment. Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601(a)(2), 2603(a)(1)(A)(i) (1976).
11. Industry has made this argument. See American 'etroleum Inst. v. OSHA,
581 F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Mar-
shall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3208-09 (news summary of questions presented), cert. granted,
id. at 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583). Petitioners in American
Petroleum also argued that this reading of the statute was bolstered by § 2(b), 29
U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976), which assures safe and healthful workplaces "so far as possi-
ble." 581 F.2d at 501. Congress inserted this language because it would be impossi-
ble to assure workers an absolutely safe and healthful workplace. The Secretary can
impose regulations assuring a safe workplace "so far as possible" because "normal
hazards [are] found in any occupation, . . . [and] particular vocations . . . are inhe-
rently dangerous." Legislative History, supra note 2, at 480.
[Vol. 49
1980] OSHA COST ANALYSIS
OSHA promulgates standards under section 6(b)(5). 12  Part I explores
the economic theory of cost analysis, focusing on OSHA's ability to
implement the theory. Part II examines the Act's statutory
framework.
I. EcoNoMicS OF COST ANALYSIS
OSHA's goal in promulgating safety standards under the Act is to
reduce or prevent injury and disease.13 These safety benefits, how-
ever, have societal and economic costs, which can be evaluated. The
threshold cost determination is whether the regulations are feasible,
that is, capable of achievement.14  Regulations are not feasible if the
technology necessary to comply with them does not exist or the costs
of compliance would bankrupt the regulated industry.15
Once feasibility is established, cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness
analysis can be used to probe the economic worth of the OSHA regu-
lation.' 6 Cost-benefit analysis weighs the costs of complying with the
12. 'Ihe Supreme Court has agreed to hear this question in AFL-CIO v. Mar-
shall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nora. American Textile Mfrs.
Inst. v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (Nos. 79-1429 & 79-15,3).
The three specific questions that the Court %vill address are whether the dispute
among the circuit courts over the meaning of economic feasibility should be resolved.
whether the feasibility requirement under § 6(b)(5) is satisfied by the mere showving
that the affected industry will not be put out of business; and whether OSHA must
show that the standard promulgated under § 6(b)(5) is reasonably necessary and that
there is a reasonable relationship between the costs and the benefits. 49 U.S.L.W. at
3208-09, 3245. The Court had previously agreed to address the question of what cost
analysis OSHA was required to perform. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA. 577
F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980). Petitioners withdrew
the case because the industry had essentially complied with the challenged OSHA
standard, and consequently, the argument that the standards were an impossible
economic burden was tenuous. Nat'l L.J., Oct. 6, 1980, at 1. col. 1, at 39, col. 2,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
13. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S. Ct. 883, 890 (1980) (OSHA
should not wait for employees to die or be injured before regulating a substance);
B & B Insulation. Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (5th Cir. 1978) (the Act is
preventive, not compensatory); cf. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 317 U.S.M 481, 486
(1943) (main purpose of Safety Appliance Act is protection); Cowins v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 299 F.2d 431, 433 (6th Cir.) (Boiler Inspection Act concerned \with protection
of employees), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2051(b)(1) (1976) (purpose of act is to protect public against unreasonable
risks of injury).
14. See J. Mendeloff, Regulating Safety 124 (1979); R. Smith, supra note 1, at
15-17.
15. M. Rothstein, Occupational Safety and Health Law §§ 38, 39, 98, 99 (1978);
see N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 252-53, 498; J. Mendeloff, supra note 14. at 76.
16. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 3.28-29. A fixed budget analysis can also be used
by business to evaluate safety costs, but it is not appropriate for governmental cost
analysis. Fixed budget analysis attempts to maximize injury reduction for a given
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regulation against the health and safety benefits that will result. 17
Cost-effectiveness analysis uses the same figures to determine which
proposed regulation best maximizes benefits while minimizing
costs.18  Cost-effectiveness analysis, unlike cost-benefit analysis, as-
sumes that all suggested regulations are worthwhile and feasible.19
Therefore, cost-benefit analysis generally precedes cost-effectiveness
analysis to determine whether it makes economic sense to regulate
the safety hazard. 20
A. Economic Benefit of Gocernment Regulation
1. Health and Safety Benefits
The probability of accident or disease is the threshold determina-
tion in evaluating the health benefits of a safety regulation. Various
sources, including scientific and occupational studies, can be used to
calculate this probability. 2 1  To supplement these sources, industry
can be compelled under the Act to compile data concerning accidents
price. This inflexible analysis can work against employees if management will not
change a predetermined health program in response to new findings. Id. at 359.
17. Id. at 328-29; J. Mendeloff, supra note 14, at 6-9.
18. J. Follmann, supra note 2, at 352. Cost-effectiveness analysis seeks to
maximize the number of lives saved for any given expenditure. See Brief for Republic
Steel Corp. at 66, American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980). A less expensive remedy for a hazard,
however, is not automatically more cost-effective; the regulation must also further
occupational safety. 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5244 (1980). See generally J. Follmann, supra
note 2, at 368-96. This Note does not address any arguments that OSHA must per-
form cost-effectiveness analysis. Cost-effectiveness ideas can be found in the Act. For
instance, if particular engineering and work practice controls are mandated by a stan-
dard, employees may in some instances, under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, § 6(d), 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (1976), find an alternate, and presumably
more cost-effective, way to meet the goal. Id. Controls are mandated only to the
extent feasible and may be supplemented with other inexpensive, yet effective, de-
vices. Society of Plastics, Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1310 (2d Cir. 1975) (res-
pirators used in addition to means of compliance suggzsted by OSHA). Other stand-
ards only indicate a permissible level of hazard and leave the means of compliance
to the employer, who may then use the most cost-effective means. United
Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 150 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980).
19. J. Follmann, supra note 2, at 352.
20. See R. Smith, supra note 1, at 34-37.
21. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. v. OSHRC, 570 F.2d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 1978)
(injury statistics) (regulation requiring steel-toed shoes); 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5001-28
(1980) (scientific studies) (cancer policy) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1990); 43 Fed.
Reg. 27350, 27350-94 (1978) (scientific studies) (cotton dust standard) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1046 (1979)); 40 Fed. Reg. 18254, 18254-57 (1975) (occupational
studies) (rollover protective structures for agricultural tractors) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1928.51 (1979)); cf. D.D. Bean & Sons Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 574
F.2d 643, 649 (1st Cir. 1978) (injury statistics: matchbooks).
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and diseases, 22 and to make available records already compiled.3 I n
most instances, OSHA can calculate statistical probabilities rather
precisely. 24  The probability of benefits accruing by limiting exposure
to toxic substances such as carcinogens, however, is so imprecise as to
make cost analysis meaningless. 25  Various time lag problems also
lessen the worth of cost analysis. For instance, the average duration
of use of a chemical wvithin an industry is only five years. 26  By the
time sufficient data can be compiled, the chemical may no longer be
in use, yet the harm will have been done. 27 Because cost analysis
assumes a certain amount of mathematical precision,'28 the appro-
priateness of requiring cost analysis is doubtful when this precision is
not possible. 29
Once the statistical probability of a health risk is established, the
value of the health preserved must be measured. 30  One traditional
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.2 (1979) (enacted pursuant to Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, § 8(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(1) (1976)); cf. Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2065(b) (1976) (requiring manufacturers to compile data on
injuries caused by their products). Employers must record illness caused or aggra-
vated by the occupational environment. General Motors Corp. (nland Di%.. [1901 3
Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) (1980 Occ. Safety & Health De.i 24,743, at
30,470 (Rev. Comm'n).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5) (1976). Medical records of employee exposure to a stis-
pected health hazard must be provided for the studies required by the Act. United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 1265. 1267-70 tW. D. Pa. 19S0).
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea. 442 F. Supp. 821, 824-26 S.D.W. Va.
1977).
24. For example, it was determined that a regulation requiring steel-toed shoes
on freight handlers would prevent nine serious injuries and the loss of 696 man
hours. United Parcel Serv. v. OSHRC, 570 F.2d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 1978). Even for
some toxic substances other than carcinogens, calculations of the risks and benefits
can be made with little uncertainty. 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5247 (1980).
25. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 79, 120-21. Estimated risks of exposure to car-
cinogens often differ by multiples of 10 to 10.000. Estimates for bladder Cancer re-
sulting from a lifetime of using saccharin range from .001 per 1.000.000 exposed, to
5,200 per 1,000,000 exposed. 45 Fed. Reg 5001, 5247 (1980). At a hearing for the
benzine standard, an industry witness attempted to graph the effect of various levels
of exposure to benzine. The witness admitted, however, that the estimate was based
on "a lousy set of data" and was slightly more than a guess. Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844. 2894 n.23 (1980).
26. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 343.
27. Id. In addition, workers often move from one job to another and are exposed
to a number of different hazardous substances, thus complicating long range studies
on the effects of exposure to specific chemicals. Brief for Federal Parties at 64-66,
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1180) iOSHA's
brief).
28. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 329; see notes 16-20 supra and accompanying
text.
29. N. Ashford, supra note 3. at 329-31.
30. Cost analysis uses dollar figures to measure the benefits obtained under a
regulation. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 327; see note 6 supra. For example, no exact
market value can be placed on clean air. Hapgood. supra note 7, at 35. Kasper.
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method of calculating the dollar value of life is to measure directly
the amount of future earnings an employee loses when life is ended
prematurely. 31 This approach, however, puts less value on groups
with lower earnings, such as the elderly, women, and the unedu-
cated, and consequently, affords them less protection.3 2 Further-
more, many low paying jobs are more hazardous and need more
safety regulation than high paying jobs. 33
An approximate dollar value for life also can be calculated by
measuring the value of the alternate ways of decreasing the number
of deaths. 34 For example, the cost of a kidney dialysis program or a
cancer treatment program shows how much society is willing to spend
to prevent death and is a measure of the value of life. 35 The varying
supra note 6, at 1020. Even if a price can be put on the item, that price may not
take certain intangibles into account. For example, the price of a bird may be $10,
but the intangible value may be infinite if the bird is the last of its species. J. Men-
deloff, supra note 14, at 70. The underlying assumption of cost analysis, that intangi-
bles have an economic value, is weakened by the argument that people who view life
and death in numerical terms are insensitive and dangerous. Hapgood, supra note 7,
at 35, 36. Nevertheless, people pay costs, in terms of increased health risks, in pur-
suit of profit or pleasure. They smoke, drive without seat belts, climb mountains, use
unsafe lawnmowers, and play loud stereos. 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5247 (1980); R. Smith,
supra note 1, at 34-35. Although the acceptable risk level for hazards voluntarily set
for leisure activities probably may not be accurately analogized to risk levels in the
workplace, 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5249 (1980), the benefits received can be used to
calculate the value people place on life and limb. Fried, The Value of Life, 82 Harv.
L. Rev. 1415 (1969). A comparison of prices of homes near airports with similar
homes in quieter, yet comparable, neighborhoods shows that people pay about $120
to $150 less for each additional decibel. But noise from traffic, which can be just as
loud, does not cause a comparable drop in prices. This might be because airports are
disliked for reasons other than noise, including the risk of crashes. R. Smith, so pra
note 1, at 46-49.
31. 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5248 (1980). Lost earnings as a measure of the value of
life frequently is used in other areas such as worker's compensation and tort law. See
5 U.S.C. §§ 8105, 8107, 8114 (1976) (worker's compensation); 1 S. Speiser, Recovery
for Wrongful Death §§ 3:8-:21 (2d ed. 1975) (tort law).
32. 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5248 (1980); R. Smith, supra note 1, at 29. Lost future
earnings are calculated to include one's total work life expectancy. Brains & Rives,
The Determination of Economic Loss in Tort Cases: The Relative Impact of Sex and
Race, 6 J. Contemp. L. 121, 125 (1979). Work life expectancy also varies for different
groups and is often caused by discrimination. Id. at 127, 131. The discrimination
inherent in pay scales and work life expectancy would be continued if lost future
earnings were used as a measure of the value of life. In addition, factors other than
safety, such as union membership or employee experience, affect future earnings. 45
Fed. Reg. 5001, 5248 (1980); R. Smith, supra note 1, at 29. Thus, use of lost earn-
ings as a measure of the value of lost life within one particular industry is imprecise
and discriminatory.
33. Studies indicate that lower income workers average more days lost due to
occupational illness or accidents than higher paid workers. J. Follmann, supra note 2.
at 75-77.
34. Kramer, Economics, Technology, and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970:
The First Six Years, 6 Ecology L.Q. 161, 166-67 (1976).
35. 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5248 (1980).
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costs of these programs, however, make calculations unreliable. 36 In
addition, the costs of these programs will be greater than the costs of
regulations resulting in comparable health benefits because society is
willing to pay more to save people in real and present danger. 37
Hazard pay, additional pay offered employees as an incentive to take
a high risk job over a safer job, 38 also provides a gauge of how much
a workplace without a hazard is worth to the employee risking
health.3 9 Once converted into annual premiums, hazard pay is useful
to gauge the value of life. 40 This calculation is not effective, how-
ever, unless workers clearly understand and can avoid the risks rep-
resented by the increaged premiums. 4 I This is rarely the case. 42
Related to hazard pay is the measure of how much an employee
would be willing to pay to avoid potential harm. 43  This amount also
could be used to calculate the value the employee places on life.
If required to perform cost analysis, OSHA would face difficulties
in measuring health benefits precisely.4" Nevertheless, the obstacles
are not insurmountable. 45 For example, the lost earnings of an aver-
age American worker could be used as a base figure of the value of
36. Outside factors can affect the amount spent on medical programs. For exam-
pie, more money may be spent for kidney disease than for hemophilia because kid-
ney disease sufferers are helpless, while hemophiliacs can protect themselves. Hap-
good, supra note 7, at 38.
37. Society and management, for example, spend a great deal of money to save a
miner trapped by a cave in, but are reluctant to spend a comparable amount on
accident prevention. J. Mendeloff, supra note 14. at 72-73; see Lovins. Cost-Risk-
Benefit Assessments in Energy Policy. 45 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 911. 927-28 (1977). See
generally Fried, supra note 30.
38. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 363-65; R. Smith. supra note 1. at 28-29.
39. 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5248 (1980); N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 364.
40. 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5248 (1980). The estimates of the value of life, using
hazard pay as the measure, range from $100,000 to $1,000,000. Id.
41. Id.; N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 364-65.
42. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 364-65. The value that an employee places on
safety may be affected by the need to support his family, the lack of other skills, and
other exigencies. Id. at 365. Workers who understand %-age premiums prefer protec-
tion from the hazard, not extra money. J. Mendeloff, supra note 14. at 76-77; see
Lovins, supra note 37, at 927-28.
43. R. Smith, supra note 1, at 34; see note 30 supra (potential harms are present
in everyday life).
44. J. Follmann, supra note 2, at 84-85. The uncertainties make a "scientific"
cost-benefit analysis impossible. Kramer, supra note 34, at 166-67. see notes 26-29
supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 7 supra. Even with the uncertainties, the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
have placed a monetary value on life Tle FAA has placed the value at about
$200,000; the NHTSA has placed it at about $240,000. J. Mendeloff, supra note 14,
at 71. Both agencies include medical costs and lost future earnings in determining
these figures. Hapgood, supra note 7, at 36. These mathematical calculations are




life. 46 This base figure could then be increased to take into account
altered pay scales for hazardous jobs and willingness to pay more to
guard against immediate dangers. 47  Similar calculations and adjust-
inents could be done to determine the value of lost physical finc-
tions, such as hearing or lost limbs. 48
2. Other Benefits
The government and the employers also benefit from government
safety regulation. 49 Direct benefits include prevention of, or de-
crease in, public assistance payments, worker's compensation costs,
medical expenses, the need for substitute labor, costs of equipment
repair, and the costs related to interrupted production."0 These ben-
efits are relatively easy to quantify. 51  Indirect benefits include the
increased productivity and morale of workers resulting from safer
conditions. 52  The regulations also may stimulate development of
nontoxic substances and safer procedures that are more efficient and
less expensive. 53 Because these indirect benefits are difficult to
quantify and causally questionable,5 4 however, they should not be,
and usually are not, included in cost analysis computations. 55
46. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. The use of lost earnings as a mea-
sure of the value of life has been criticized because arguably irrelevant factors that
affect earnings would be considered. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
The use of a national average would eliminate this discrimination as to specific work-
ers or jobs.
47. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
48. A base figure could be assigned for each health loss. See 5 U.S.C. § 8107(c)
(1976) (varying amounts of compensation for loss of different parts of the body). This
figure could be increased to compensate for obvious and immediate dangers. See text
accompanying note 47 supra.
49. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 350-51. Any comprehensive cost analysis would
have to include societal or governmental benefits as well as industrial benefits. See
N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 351. Including governmental benefits in OSHA cost
analysis is especially appropriate because government would be conducting the
analysis. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
50. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 347, 351. Government social welfare agencies
may have to pay for the rehabilitation, retraining, medical costs, and direct mainte-
nance of the injured employee. Improved health conditions on the job also benefit
the employee's family and friends, who would be affected by the pain and suffering
following the loss or injury of a loved one. Id. at 351. See generally J. Follmann,
supra note 2, at 84-92.
51. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 347; see United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No.
79-1048, slip op. at 168-70 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980).
52. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 326; J. Follmann, supra note 2, at 92-93.
53. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 326-27. This benefit should be sought because
the Act is intended to force the development of safer technology, 45 Fed. Reg.
5001, 5245 (1980); see Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
54. 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5238 (1980); J. Follmann, supra note 2, at 92-93; cf. L.
Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 11-39, 186-194 (1927) (indirect results are ig-
nored in tort law under the doctrine of proximate cause); W. Prosser, Handbook of
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B. Economic Cost of Government Regulation
Once the benefits have been calculated, the second step of cost
analysis is to quantify the cost of the OSHA regulation.5 6 Costs to
industry include physical plant changes in machinery, ventilation sys-
tems, and the physical environment. Education programs also may be
needed to acquaint employees with safety regulations that must be
monitored or obeyed. 57  These costs have been easily and reliably
quantified by OSHIA. 5 8  Indirect costs to industry include organiza-
tional changes that rotate workers to limit exposure of each worker to
the danger, and damages to the competitive structure of industry
both nationally and internationally. 59  Because these indirect costs,
like indirect benefits, are difficult to quantify and causally questiona-
ble, however, they should not be, and usbally are not, included in
cost analysis computations.6 0
Even if the costs were limited to those that are direct and easily
quantified, problems arise. First, the costs of compliance may vary
depending on whether measured at the time the regulation is pro-
posed or the time the regulation takes effect. 61  This problem is eas-
ilv resolved. Because the Act is intended to force the development of
newv technology, 62 the costs of compliance should be measured at the
time the regulation takes effect. Second, properly measured costs can
the Law of Torts § 43 (1971) (the more tenuous the causal connection between an act
and tortious injury, the less likely a finding of liability).
55. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 325-26: see note 29 supra and accompanying text
(precision is a prerequisite of cost analysis).
56. See notes 13-18 supra and accompanying text. See generally J. Folhnann.
supra note 2, at 248-62.
57. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 315-16. One infrequent cost to industry is work
stoppage by employees who do not like a regulation. See Atlantic & Gulf Ste'edores.
Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 54647 (3d Cir. 1976) (work stoppage to protest wear-
ing protective gear).
58. To determine the economic feasibility of regulations. OSHA commissions re-
ports by consultants on the costs of the proposed regulations. then revises the esti-
mates to eliminate any improper counting. United Steelworkers %,. Marshall. No.
79-1048, slip op. at 166-68 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980); see 45 Fed. Reg. 5001. 523S
(1980).
59. N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 315-16: ef. Energy Policy and Conservation Act.
42 U.S.C. § 6295(d) (Supp. II 1978) (impact of lessening competition is a cost to be
weighed). Firms that cannot comply with the standard might go out of business.
Moreover, United States firms may be hurt competitively if foreign firms do not have
to comply with equally expensive health standards. N. Ashford. supra note 3. at 316.
60. See N. Ashford, supra note 3, at 317-25. note 54 supra. In addition to the
imprecision and causation problems, disregarding indirect costs and benefits -also can
be presumptively justified as unquantified benefits offsetting unquantified costs.
61. Kasper, supra note 6, at 1019.
62. See note 53 supra. Because OSHA can rely on technological means of com-
pliance that are still experimental, estimating the costs is difficult. United Steelwork-
ers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 147 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15. 190.
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be improperly allocated. For example, double counting occurs when
compliance costs of overlapping standards are not divided proportion-
ately between the standards,63 or when previously made expenditures
are included in the costs of meeting the new standard.6 4 This prob-
lem can be alleviated by considering only the additional costs of com-
plying with an OSHA regulation, 6 5 allowing for certain discretionary
adjustments to be made in the interest of fairness. 66 Third, occasion-
ally even adequately precise measures are insufficient, as when a sub-
stance prevents one health hazard and causes another. 67 In this in-
stance, someone must decide whether to protect against the present
or future danger, assuming no substitute is available.6 8  Cost analysis
cannot replace this basic policy decision.
63. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 166-67 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 15, 1980).
64. Id. at 168 n.130; AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 659-60 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. granted sub noin. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W.
3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583). Another instance of double count-
ing occurs when costs not yet expended to meet an old standard are included in the
costs of the new standard. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at
166 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980). Moreover, the cost of the standard may fall on the
industry at one time. Prior to 1969, for example, only one state allowed victims of
black lung disease to receive worker's compensation, even though nearly one third of
the employees studied had the disease. When the Coal Mdine Health and Safety Act
of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976), was passed, these afflicted workers and their
survivors became eligible for worker's compensation. Id. §J 901, 922a. The employers thus
became responsible for disability payments and insurance coverage at one time, See
id. § 932(b). The economic strain of health regulation is rarely this great. N. Ashford,
supra note 3, at 324-25; see AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 659-60, cert.
granted sub nora. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 1980) (Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583).
65. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 237 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 15, 1980); 43 Fed Reg. 54353, 54494 (1978) (lead standard).
66. Although OSHA is concerned only with one standard at one time, it will
consider prior costs to the industry of other regulations promulgated by OSHA or
another agency. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 237 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 15, 1980). The costs incurred become part of the economics of the industry
and thus are important in determining what impact the costs of the proposed stan-
dard will have on the economic base of the industry. Id.; 43 Fed. Reg. 54353, 54494
(1978) (lead standard).
67. Green, supra note 7, at 906. For example, TRIS makes clothing flame re-
tardant, but is a carcinogen. Id.
68. Kasper, supra note 6, at 1024. Cost analysis "can help to further our under-
standing of environmental [and other] problems and, in the long run, lead to better
and more informed decisions." Id. Questions on the firontiers of science, although
somewhat factual, ultimately have to be decided on the basis of policy. Industrial
Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Moreover, compassion
and good judgment can override scientific analysis. Kasper, supra note 6, at 1024,
Policy considerations enter the decision making process because politics are involved.
The agencies are accountable to legislators, and the legislators are accountable to the
public. In the interest of political survival, agencies will temper regulations to please
as many of the right people as possible. Green, supra note 7, at 905.
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Because cost analysis is a more objective way for OSHA to make
regulatory decisions, cost analysis is to be preferred when adequate
measures of a regulation's costs and benefits are available.ou When
the measures are imprecise, as with carcinogens, 70 or when conflict-
ing risks are involved, 71 however, cost analysis should not and can-
not displace the policy question properly within OSHA's discretionary
powers. If cost analysis were required, effective government regula-
tion would be stymied, and the nature of the decision would be dis-
torted to comport with inappropriate economic terms.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE ACT
A. Cost Analysis Under Section 6(b )(5)
Section 6(b)(5) requires that regulation of toxic substances be "'set
[at the level] which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,
on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health." 72 Semantically, this language,
like the language in other statutes, 73 seems to require only that the
regulations be feasible, 74 both technologically 73 and economically. 76
69. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. The government has a limited
amount of money and almost unlimited ways of spending it. Cost analysis would
allow the administrators to decide how to spend the money. At the same time, it
would enable them to justify their spending and show that the decisions were not
arbitrary. Hapgood, supra note 7, at 36. Moreover, the public could more closely
scrutinize how tax dollars are spent. Id. at 38.
70. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
72. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b(5)
(1976).
73. Federal Mine and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6)(A) (Supp. 11 1978) (con-
sider the feasibility of the standard). The legislative history of the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201-6422 (1976) (consider technical feasibility and
whether benefits exceed burdens), states that the word feasible means capable of
being carried out, and -[e]conomic feasibility refers to whether or not a manufacturer
has the economic capability to carry out the requirements of an energy efficiency
standard." S. Rep. No. 516, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 172, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 1956, 2014. Feasibility is an implicit requirement in other stat-
utes. Ports & Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1224(a)(7) (Supp. 11 1978) (economic
impact is a factor to be considered); Public Health and Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. §
242b(a)(2)(E) (Supp. II 1978) (economic factors to be considered).
74. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
75. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1975). Manufacturers
must be able to develop and install engineering and work practice controls to meet
an OSHA standard. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 159
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980). OSHA is not limited to existing technology, however, and
may require technology that has yet to be developed, ld.; Society of Plastics In-
dus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975). See generally M. Rothstein, supra note 15, § 38.
76. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1975); accord. Industrial Union
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The case law supports this view. In Industrial Union Department v.
Hodgson,77 the District of Columbia Circuit defined economically
feasible standards as those not threatening the existence or competi-
tiveness of the industry. 78  The Third Circuit, in AFL-CIO v. Bren-
nan,7 9 defined economicallh feasible standards as those that did not
create "'the possibility of massive economic dislocation." 8  In both
instances, this requirement did not mandate cost analysis beyond
feasibility.8 1
The legislative history further bolsters this interpretation. The fre-
quent references to, and focus on, toxic materials and harmful physi-
cal agents 8 2 indicate that Congress intended section 6(b)(5) to provide
OSHA with the means to protect workers against hazards caused by
everchanging substances and technology.8 3 The legislative history is
replete with concern about the dangers caused by these "insidious
"silent' killers" 84 and the traditional neglect of people working with
Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2903 (1980) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). See generally M. Rothstein, supra note 15, §§ 39, 99.
77. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
78. Id. at 478. The elimination of some competitors does not necessarily destroy
competition. For example, in United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 15, 1980), the court found that as many as 200 small producers would go
out of business because of a regulation. Id., slip op. at 204. Nevertheless, OSHA
could find that competition survived because of the continued existence of at least 30
firms with 100 plants. Id. The market share of the larger producers, therefore,
would increase only slightly. Id.
79. 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 123.
81. Id.; Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir.
1974); see Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2902
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Although helpful to promote informed decisionmaking and
to set priorities among hazardous substances that must be regulated, cost-benefit
analysis is not mandated. Id. at 2897 n.26, AFL-CIO v. ,larshall, 617 F.2d 636, 663
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. American Textile Mfrs, Inst. v. Marshall.
49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583); cf. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (in the
absence of firm data, cost-benefit analysis is not required in the rule-making context).
82. Legislative History, supra note 2, at 160 (important to undertake studies of
toxic agents); id. at 415 (exposure of workers to toxic substances and harmful physical
agents of particular concern) (statement of Sen. Williams); id. at 859 (many problems
caused by carcinogenic and toxic substances). An earlier House draft of this section
stated that all standards were covered by the wording of § 6(b)(5). ld. at 9,3, The
qualifying words, "toxic substances or harmful physical agents," were added in De-
cember of 1970 upon agreement of the House and Senate. Id. at 1188.
83. "Not only are occupational diseases which first came to light at the beginning
of the Industrial Revolution still undermining the health of workers, but new sub-
stances, new processes, and new sources of energy are presenting health problems of
ever-increasing complexity." Legislative History, supra note 2, at iii (foreword).
84. Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1003 (statement of Sen. Daniels); a'-
cord, id. at 142; id. at 160; id. at 338-39 (statement of Sen. Saxbe); id. at 415, 431
(statements of Sen. Williams); id. at 849; id. at 1052 (statement of Sen. Broomfield).
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these substances.8 5 This Congressional concern motivated the
enactment of not only the permanent procedures of section 6(b)(5), but
also the procedures for enacting temporary emergency regulations
under section 6(c). 86 The legislative history of the Act makes clear
that employee safety is the primary goal,87 the cost of compliance
with safety standards should be considered a necessary business ex-
pense, 88 and the costs of regulation of carcinogens need not be pre-
cisely quantified. 89 The only limitation is that complying with OSHA
85. Id. at 412-13 (statement of Sen. Williams). Concern over the dangers to
workers who deal with hazardous substances led to the proposal of a bill, prior to the
enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. that would have regulated
only those industries that dealt with toxic substances. Id. at 1082-84.
86. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(c)(1). 29 U.S.C, § 65.51cID
(1976). Past attempts to regulate substances under this section have been invalidated.
Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385. 389 t3d Cir. 1974).
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); Florida Peach Growers Ass'n. Inc. v. Department
of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. 1974). Dry Color Mfrs, Ass'n, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1973). Nevertheless, section 6(c) still allows
OSHA to promulgate standards for any "'new" hazards. Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, § 6(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1)(A) (1976); see Legislative His-
tory, supra note 2, at 1016-17 (statement of Rep. Erlenborn).
87. Legislative History, supra note 2. at 1030 (statement of Rep. Dent). Other
legislators condemned those who complained about the excessive costs of complying
with safety standards. Id. at 510 (statement of Sen. Yarborough). "Is it too expensive
for the employee who loses his hand or leg or eyesight? Is it too expensive for the
widow trying to raise her children on meager allowance under workmen's compensation
and social security? And what about the man-a good hard-working man-tied to a
wheel chair or hospital bed for the rest of his life? That is what we are dealing with
when we talk about industrial safety." Id. The House Report concluded that even
one life w-s too great a price to pay for progress. Id. at 865.
88. Id. at 1150 (statement of Sen. Eagleton). Part of these costs would fall on the
consumer in the form of higher prices, hi. at 444 (statement of Sen. Yarborougl.
Indeed, some marginally efficient businesses could be expected to fail because of the
imposition of the standards. Industrial Union Dep't N. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1974). For these businesses, however. regulation may only hasten their
inevitable failure. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA. 526 F.2d 1027. 10534 (3d Cir.
1975), modified, 560 F.2d 589 (1977). cert. denied. 435 U.S. 914 (1978). See generally
N. Ashford, supra note 3. at 366-73: J. Follmnann. supra note 2, at 279-90.
89. OSHA's regulations can be based on the best available evidence. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(b)(5). 29 U.S.C. § 65(b)(5) (1976). Factual de-
terminations are not always possible when promulgating standards. Industrial Union Dep't
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Regulation of a suspected car-
cinogen is often based only on tests performed on animals. When a substance is
shown to be carcinogenic in two animal species, § 6(b)(5) requires that the substance
be considered carcinogenic in humans. See Synthetic Organic Chemn. Mfrs. Ass'n %.
Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (3d Cir. 1974) (construing 29 U.S.C. §§ 6,5Aao.
655(b)(5) (1976)) (upholding this "'prudent" legislative action), cert, denied. 420 U..
973 (1975). To conform with its statutory duty to state the basis of governmental
regulations, see note 7 supra, OSHA adopted a formal policy for regulating carcino-
gens, effective April 21, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 5001-296 (1980). This policy has yet to
be tested in court. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 §. Ct.
2844, 2876 & n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). Five Justices have held that quantification
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regulations under section 6(b)(5) must be within the realm of feasibil-
ity, 90 a requirement necessitated by the government's inability to
make the workplace risk-free. 91
One line of cases, however, arguably precludes this conclusion.
Two circuit courts, following the Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission's (OSHRC's) determinations, have held that use of
the section 6(b)(5) standard of feasibility when regulating noise 2 re-
quires a weighing of costs and benefits. 93 The reasoning employed
by the OSHRC is erroneous in at least three respects. First, the word
feasibility should be narrowly construed. Limiting OSHA's discretion
cannot be required in all cases. Id. at 2876 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2900 &
n.29 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, White. and Blackmun joined in Jus-
tice Marshall's dissenting opinion. This significant health hazard can be established
by expert testimony or opinion. Id. at 2876 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub
noma. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980)
(Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825,
836-37 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980); Industrial Union Dep't v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The feasibility requirement is
reasonable because evasion becomes more likely as compliance becomes more expen-
sive. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1975). Moreover, the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970 amended the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §
631 (1976), to help small businesses meet the costs of the regulations. "[bLoans ...
determine[d] to be necessary or appropriate to assist any small business concern in
effecting [compliance] with the applicable standards promulgated pursuant to section
6 of [the Act shall be made] if the Administration determines that [the small
business] is likely to suffer substantial economic injury without assistance .... " Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 28, 84 Stat. 1618
(amended 1974 to cover all federal regulations).
91. Legislative History, supra note 2, at 423 (statement of Sen. Dominick) R.
Smith, supra note 1, at 34. "'No job can be rendered perfectly safe, and no employee
can be made perfectly secure from injury. Hence, it is impossible to fashion criteria
which would assure these unattainable goals." Legislative History, supra note 2, at
480 (statement of Sen. Dominick). An earlier standard required that "no
employee . . . suffer any impairment of health." Id. at 242 (emphasis added). This
wording was deemed unrealistic because it could mandate the closing of every busi-
ness in the United States. Id. at 367 (statement of Sen. Dominick); see id. at 345, 502
(statements of Sen. Dominick).
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b) (1979). The standard states that "[wl]hen employees
are subjected to sound exceeding those listed in Table G-16, feasible administrative
or engineering controls shall be utilized." Id. at § 1910.95(b)(1).
93. RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1979); Turner
Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1977); Carnation Co., [1978]
Occ. Safety & Health Dec. (CCH) 22,837, at 27,622 (Rev. Comm'n); Castle & Cooke
Foods, [1977-1978] Occ. Safety & Health Dec. (CCH) 21,854, at 26,329 (Rev. Comm'n
1977); Great Falls Tribune Co., [1977-1978] Occ. Safety & Health Dec. (CCH) 21,844, at
26,306 (Rev. Comm'n 1977); Continental Can Co., Inc., [1976-1977] Occ. Safety & Health
Dec. (CCH) 21,009, at 25,256 (Rev. Comm'n 1976).
[Vol. 49
1980] OSHA COST ANALYSIS
by requiring cost-benefit analysis 94 can be, and should be, made
clear. 95 Second, although the seriousness of the hazard determines
which cost analysis to apply, 96 Congress has already defined serious
health hazards by enacting section 6(b)(5). 97  The question is not
whether noise hazards are serious, but whether Congress intended
noise hazards to be vithin the ambit of section 6(b)(5). Because noise
hazards are clearly wvithin this ambit, 98 and thus defined as a serious
health hazard, requiring cost-benefit analysis frustrates Congressional
intent. Third, the challenged noise regulation was promulgated pur-
suant to section 6(a) as an "established Federal standard." 99  Because
neither section 6(a) nor the history of this regulation requires any cost
analysis, 100 no cost analysis should be required.' 10  In any case,
even the OSHRC agrees that cost-benefit analysis is required only
when regulating noise, not toxic substances such as carcinogens,
which would still require only a feasibility analysis.1 02
94. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 662, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (cost-
benefit analysis is more constraining than feasibility analysis), cert. granted sub nora.
American Textile Mffrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980)
(Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583).
95. See notes 108-09 infra and accompanying text. Procedural requirements not
mandated by Congress cannot be imposed by the courts. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.. 435 U.S. 519, 55S (1978).
the decision to mandate cost-benefit analysis is a policy question appropriately resol-
ved by the legislatures and not by the courts. Id. In interpreting a statute, however,
a court may find that cost-benefit analysis is mandated implicitly by the statute. Un-
ited Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 7 n.6 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15,
1980); AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636. 665 n.167 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
granted sub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 1980) (Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583); see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978).
96. Compare Continental Can Co., Inc.. [1976-19771 Occ. Safety & Health Dec.
(CCH) 21,009, at 25,256 (Rev. Comm'n 1976) teith notes 82-85 supra and accom-
panying text.
97. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 65.5ab)5
(1976). This provision specifically covers "'toxic materials [and] harmful physical
agents." Id.; see note 82 supra and accompanying text.
98. Legislators considered excessive noise to be a harmful physical agent %ithin
the meaning of § 6(b)(5) and thus subject to the "-feasibility" requirement. Legislative
History, supra note 2, at 845.
99. Continental Can Co., Inc.. [1976-1977] Occ. Safety & Health Dec. (CCH •
21,009, at 25,255 n. 15 (Rev. Comm'n 1976). An "'established Federal standard" is an
occupational safety and health standard enacted by a federal agency or contained in
an act of Congress prior to the Act. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, §
3(10), 29 U.S.C. § 652(10) (1976).
100. Continental Can Co., Inc., [1976-1977] Occ. Safety & Health Dec. tCCH) c
21,009, at 25,256 (Rev. Comm'n 1976).
101. See note 95 supra.
102. See Castle & Cooke Foods, [1977-1978] Occ. Safety & Health Dec. (CCH) c
21,854, at 26,329-30 (Rev. Comm'n 1977) (carcinogens are a more serious health hazard
than noise and merit different treatment). The court in AFL-CIO v. Marshall. 617
F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub noan. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v.
Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6. 1980) (Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1-83), inter-
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B. Cost Analysis Under Section 3(8) and Its Effect on Section 6(b)(5)
Section 3(8), a general definitional provision, provides that an
occupational safety and health standard be "reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe" working conditions.1 03 The legislative his-
tory provides few guidelines for interpreting the "reasonably neces-
sary" language of section 3(8).104 One Supreme Court justice, how-
ever, has stated that section 3(8) requires that benefits of regulations
under the Act must be reasonably related to the costs. 10 5 The Fifth
and Eighth Circuits also have held that the language of section 3(8)
mandates cost-benefit analysis, 10 6 with the formality of the analysis
dependent on the precision with which the risks and benefits can be
calculated. 107
preted the language used by the Commissioner to indicate that the Commissioner's
ruling applied only to less harmful hazards and not those that posed a serious risk.
Id. at 665 n.169 (distinguishing Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82, 86
(7th Cir. 1977)).
103. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
104. The meaning of section 3(8) can perhaps be derived from one Senator's
characterization of the Act as an attempt to balance the need of the worker to have a
safe workplace (safety benefits), against the requirement that industry function with-
out undue interference (industry costs). Legislative History, supra note 2, at 435
(statement of Sen. Williams).
105. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2877-
78 & n.5 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
106. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd
sub nor. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844
(1980); United Parcels Serv. v. OSHRC, 570 F.2d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 1978). Other
circuits have not interpreted the "reasonably necessary" language. 581 F.2d at 505. In
United Parcels, a regulation requiring employees who handle packages to be
equipped with steel-toed shoes was invalidated because the costs were not justified
by the expected health benefits. 570 F.2d at 812. In view of the nature of the busi-
ness involved, the smdl size of the vast majority of the parcels handled, the low
incidence of injuries resulting from falling parcels, and the high rate of turnover
among employees who would have to be equipped with the shoes, the court held
that the standard was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. Id. In holding that a
reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits was required by § 3(8), the
Fifth Circuit relied on Aqua Slide N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978), in which it had ruled that analogous "reason-
ably necessary" language in the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. §
2058(c)(2)(A) (1976), required a determination of whether the benefits bear a reasona-
ble relationship to the costs. 569 F.2d at 839-40. Because the purpose of the Act is to
protect workers from dangerous conditions, see notes 2-3 supra and accompanying
text, and the purpose of the CPSA is to protect consumers from dangerous products,
the court felt compelled to follow the reasoning in Aqua Slide. 581 F.2d at 502.
107. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1978)
(carcinogen: reasonable relationship required), aff'd on other grounds sub now. In-
dustrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980); United
Parcels Serv. v. OSHRC, 570 F.2d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 1978) (steeltoed shoes: precise
weighing required). The regulator must have some factual basis for estimating
whether benefits will be reasonably related to costs. American Petroleum Inst. v.
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Similar statutory language also has been interpreted to mandate
cost-benefit analysis. In some statutes, formalized cost-benefit analysis
is mandated by express language requiring a weighing of the costs
and benefits of a proposed regulation.108  Other statutes, with lan-
guage similar to that of section 3(8), mandate a balancing test to in-
sure that the costs are not wholly disproportionate to the benefits.109
OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other ground.s sub nora. Indus-
trial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (I1S0. see note 7
supra and accompanying text.
108. E.g., Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. 4
136(bb) (1976) ("tak[e) into account the economic ... costs and benefits of the use of
any pesticide"), construed in Chemical Specialities Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 484 F. Supp.
513, 515-16 (D.D.C. 1980); Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1976) ("benefits to
whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs"), construed in
United States v. West Virginia Power Co., 122 F.2d 733. 737-38 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 683 (1941) and Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Poteat. 457 F. Supp.
1177, 1186 (D. Mont. 1978), aff'd in part, rer'd in part, 594 F.2d 742 (9th Cir.
1979); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 62951ai(2)(D). (bt2D. (c). (d)
(1976 & Supp. H 1978) (must have benefits that exceed the burdens.
109. E.g., Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058ct2)tA) (1976
("reasonably necessary"), construed in D.D. Bean & Sons Co. v. Commissioner Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 574 F.2d 643, 649 (1st Cir. 1978) and Aqua Slide "N" Dive Corp.
v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831. 838-40 (5th Cir. 1978), Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(1)(B), 1314(b)(2)(B). 1314(b)(4)(B) (1976
& Supp. II 1978) (reasonable relationship between costs and benefits), construed
in BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 656 (1st Cir. 1979). cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1063 (1980) and American Paper hIst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 3.53-54
(D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 967 (1976) and FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d
973, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1976). Courts do not always agree on the standard mandated by
statutory language. For instance, the language of the National Environinental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976) ("presently unquantified en ironmental
amenities and values" should be considered), is interpreted sometimes to require
formalized cost-benefit analysis and sometimes to require only a balancing. Compare
Trout Unltd. v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1974) (formal cost-benefit
analysis not required) and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 439 F.
Supp. 980, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (cost-benefit analysis broadly defined and Cape
Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 413 (W.D. \'a.) (costs may outweigh
benefits without regulation becoming invalid), af'd. 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973)
with Clavert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113
(D.C. Cir. 1971) ("NEPA mandates a rather finely tuned and "systematic' balancing
analysis") and National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 1245, 1253 (D.D.C.
1977) (finely tuned balancing analysis required) and 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1980)
(Council on Environmental Quality, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1976), favors
explicit, though informal, cost-benefit analysis). See generally F. Anderson, NEPA in
the Courts 246-51 (1973); E. Murphy, Nature, Bureaucracy and the Rules of Property
275-77 (1977); S. Rosen, Manual for Environmental hnpact Evaluation 20-21 (1976).
Statutes also may require both feasibility and cost-benefit analysis. E.g.. Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (Supp. I 1978) (feasibility and cost-
benefit analysis); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(A) (Supp. I1 1978) (feasibility
when health is endangered); id. § 7545(c)(2)(B) (Supp. I 1978) (cost-benefit for
machinery); see Amoco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722,
736-37 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Assuming section 3(8) requires at least an informal balancing of
costs and benefits, and section 6(b)(5) requires only feasibility, the
question becomes whether the section 3(8) test controls when prom-
ulgating standards under section 6(b)(5). 110 In Industrial Union De-
partment v. American Petroleum Institute,"' the Supreme Court dis-
cussed section 3(8)'s effect on standards promulgated under section
6(b)(5) for the threshold determination of whether a significant health
risk must be shown before promulgating a regulation. 112 The plural-
ity, refusing to address the cost analysis question, stated that section
3(8) has to be read in conjunction with section 6(b)(5). 113 Justice
Powell extended this reasoning to cost analysis and argued that
OSHA must weigh costs and benefits before promulgating standards
under section 6(b)(5).1 4 The four dissenters, along with Justice
Rehnquist, argued that in no instance, including the threshold risk
determination, is the" express language of section 6(b)(5) superseded
by the language of section 3(8). 115 The circuits are similarly split.
The Fifth Circuit agrees with Justice Powell's reasoning;116 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit agrees with the dissent's reasoning. 117
The rules of statutory construction bolster the interpretation that
section 6(b)(5) controls. The meaning given in a general definitional
clause controls throughout the statute, unless the definition gives rise
to obvious incongruities or defeats the major purposes of the legisla-
tion. 118  Requiring OSHA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis would
frustrate Congressional intent to facilitate regulation of the "'silent kill-
ers." 119 Moreover, a specific provision governs over a general pro-
110. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
111. 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
112. Id. at 2863 (plurality opinion). For a discussion of the threshold risk determi-
nation, see note 5 supra.
113. id. at 2850, 2866.
114. Id. at 2875, 2877 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell agreed with the
Fifth Circuit's position on this issue, as enunciated in American Petroleum Inst. v.
OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nomn. In-
dustrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
115. 100 S. Ct. at 2883 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 2899 n.28 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justices Brennan, White, anil Blackmun joined in Justice Marshall's dis-
senting opinion.
116. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1978),
aff'd on other grounds sub norn. Industrial Union Dep'l v. American Petroleum
Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980): see note 114 supra.
117. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 140 n.102 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 15, 1980); AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
granted sub nora. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 1980) (Nos. 79-1429 & 79-1583).
118. 1A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 27.02 (4th
ed. 1972); see State v. Howell, 77 S.D. 518, 523, 95 N.W.2d 36, 39 (1959) (context
indicated word carried different meaning in amendment than what had been clearly
defined in the previous act).
119. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
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vision when the specific section expressly alters the general rule.120
Section 6(b)(5) should control because it expressly deals with the pro-
cedure for regulating toxic materials with a specific cost analysis. 12 1
The economics of cost analysis and the legislative history of section
6(b)(5) also support the conclusion that section 6(b)(5) should control
the procedure for regulating toxic substances. The hazards of carcino-
gens are very difficult to quantify; requiring cost-benefit analysis
might effectively preclude government regulation. 122 These difficul-
ties were recognized and considered by Congress in passing section
6(b)(5). 123  Requiring cost-benefit analysis under section 3(8) would
frustrate that Congressional intent.124 The difficulty of measuring the
dangers of toxic substances, coupled vith the unquestioned severity
of the harm that results, led Congress to discuss toxic substances in
some depth and require only a feasibility test before regulation.' 25
This concern is in marked contrast to the paucity of legislative history
on the cost analysis required under section 3(8).126 Surely the
specific and clear feasibility requirement of section 6(b)(5) should pre-
vail over the implied and unclear cost-benefit requirement of section
3(8).127 Moreover, because a court cannot alter the procedural re-
quirements set by the legislature,'12 and must favor the facilitation of
government regulation furthering public health and safety,' 29 section
6(b)(5)'s less strict standard should control.
CONCLUSION
Strict formalized cost analysis would hinder the regulation of toxic
substances for which costs and benefits cannot be accurately quan-
tified. Although cost analysis would facilitate implementation of stan-
dards regulating dangers that do not threaten life, money and effi-
ciency should not be the major concern when lives are at stake. The
purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health Act is not to protect as
many workers as is profitable and to sacrifice the others. Rather, the
goal is to protect as many workers as possible. The "cost" of safety
regulation is something any civilized society should be willing to pay.
Maria Scorcia
120. FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988, 993-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 487 F.2d 865, 877 n.26 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Jackson, 143 F. 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1906). See generally 2A C. Sands, Suther-
land's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.07 (4th ed. 1972).
121. See note 82 supra.
122. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
123. See note 89 supra.
124. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
126. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 82-91, 104 supra and accompanying text.
128. See note 95 supra.
129. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
1980]
